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ABSTRACT 
Informed consent is the primary tool by which the autonomy of the patient and other 
health consumers is protected in the medical environment. It has been the subject of much 
attention in the medical and public arena. This was escalated in New Zealand by the 
Report of the Cervical Cancer Inquiry in 1988 which details many flaws in the processes 
and protections of informed consent. 
Following the recommendations in this report, the Office of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers Rights (the 
Code) came into existence. Right 6 covers the requisite disclosure of information to 
consumers. 
This paper examines the implications of this Right and places it in context with the 
common law doctrine of informed consent. The common law has often fallen short of the 
ideals and purpose of informed consent in its struggle with the competing claims of the 
medical profession and the focus on compensating for physical injury. Unlike the 
common law, the Code does not hinge on physical injury, but on the processes of 
consumer rights. As a consequence it is freed from the bounds of causation. 
The Code may also have an impact within the traditional legal forums. A Court 
considering an action of informed consent should consider the Code as a indication of 
current social and legislative perceptions about the requirements upon the medical 
professions. 
Of vital importance for this paper is the aim of reconciling the rights of informed consent 
with the purpose of informed consent. 
Over himself, over his own txxly and mind, the individual is sovereign 
John Stuart Mill 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 15328 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Fairy tales are so appealing because ultimately they reduce complex human encounters to 
enchanting simplicity. In listening to them we suspend judgment and believe that .. . it is 
possible to utter magic words or perform magic deeds which transform frogs into princes or 
punish greedy fishermen's wives. The phrase "informed consent" evokes the same magic 
expectations. Its protagonists often convey that once kissed by the doctrine, frog patients will 
become autonomous princes. Its antagonists warn that all the gold of good medical care which 
physician magnanimously bestow on patients will turn to worthless metal if the curse of 
informed consent were to remain with us.1 
Although the rhetoric of informed consent is pervasive in the medical setting, actual 
implementation often falls short of its stated importance. Causation requirements 
which are inherent in a negligence action, have eroded the doctrine to a duty to warn. 
This does not reflect the basis of the doctrine which is to safeguard the autonomy of 
the individual. The arguments of the antagonists are influential in the common law. 
This is the environment into which the Code of Health and Disability Consumers' 
Rights (the Code) was introduced. This paper examines the effect that this will have 
upon informed consent in New Zealand. To do so it must continually be distinguished 
between the myth and reality. 
The ethical basis for informed consent is detailed in Part II. This focuses upon the 
principle of autonomy. Part III outlines the jurisprudence which exists internationally 
and domestically. This includes an comparison of the professional focused duty of 
care and the patient focused standard. In Part IV the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1995 (HDCA) is introduced. Part V contains an analysis of Right 
6. This Right covers disclosure of information generally and for the purpose of 
informed consent. The writer concludes that Right 6 can be interpreted more widely 
than the doctrine is interpreted at common law. Having established that this 
interpretation varies from the international treatments of the doctrine, Part VI questions 
what impact the Code and especially Right 6 will have on any claims of negligence in 
the common law. Finally there is discussion of whether the Code can maintain a 
statutory duty. 
J Katz "Informed Consent-A Fairytale? Laws Vision" (1977) 39 U Pitt LR 137, 137. 
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II THE ETHICAL BASIS OF INFORMED CONSENT 
A Introduction 
The development of the doctrine of informed consent has its source in both law and 
ethics. Each contributes its own initiatives whilst taking note and effect of the 
contributions of the other. As such it is important to begin a legal analysis of a modem 
legal development with an examination of the ethical context. The primary ethical 
source of informed consent in the principle of autonomy.2 
B Autonomy 
Autonomy is a prima facie attribute of all moral agents.3 It is an attribute which 
extends to many areas of individual life, of which medicine is only one. Most of the 
work on autonomy stems from the writings of Immanual Kant and John Stuart Mill. 
These two philosophers were theoretically approaching autonomy from different 
angles and as a consequence their interpretations differ. 
Kant4 adopted a deontological perspective. He viewed obligations as independent 
from individual practical concerns. An action is judged by whether the generalisation 
which follows from the act is morally good. Thus if what you do does not yield a rule 
which is acceptable for everyone to follow, it is not morally worthy. He calls this a 
categorical imperative. 
From this he derived the rule that people must be treated as an ends and never a means 
only. Each individual must have the freedom to pursue their own internal ethical 
system. Therefore people must treat themselves and therefore all others as ends in 
themselves. 
Mills5 focused less on the internal beliefs and pursuits of the individual. Instead he 
determined that as long as the individual has a concept of how to maximise their 
happiness without infringing upon the similar pursuit of others, the person must be 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Autonomy is only one of the four principles which form the principled approach to 
biomedical ethics espoused by Beauchamp and Childress. The other principles are: non 
malificence, beneficence, and justice. See T L Beauchamp and J K Childress Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (4 ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994). 
This section draws primarily from the following sources: PS Appelbaum, C Litz and A 
MeiseUnformed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1987) 17-32, T L Beauchamp and J K Childress, above n 2, 56-62. 
See generally I Kant Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Trans. L White Beck (New 
York, MacMillan, 1985). 
See generally Mill J S, G Hirnmerfarb (ed)On Liberty (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982). 
3 
free to do so. Thus his focus was upon lack of interference. Mills demonstrates a 
utilitarian approach where the value of an action is judged by its consequence. For 
Mills the consequence should be the maximisation of happiness. 6 
C Informed Consent 
The need for informed consent follows from the right to autonomy.7 It is the 
manifestation of autonomy in the medical setting. For Kant it required that the doctor 
restrain from coercing the patient, and that they provide them with all the information 
necessary for rational decision making. Applying the categorical imperative makes this 
relatively easy to use. The principle must be followed regardless of further 
considerations. 
For a consequentialist the determination is more difficult because many factors may 
influence the outcome. Examples of factors compiled by Katz and Capron are:8 
individual autonomy, protection of patients and subjects, rational decision making, 
and medical self-scrutiny. Perhaps the primary conflict facing autonomy in the medical 
setting is between autonomy and health.9 This is evident in justifications for ignoring 
the autonomous choice of the individual and imposing an action which is objectively 
better for them. Most subsequent debate exhibits this dichotomy. 
However although disparity exists, ethical informed consent can still be broadly 
defined as: 10 
D 
the core notion that decisions about the medical care a person will receive, if any, are to be 
made in a collaborative manner between patient and physician. 
Disclosure of Information 
Informed consent is a complex procedure. It is best divided into three element. 11 First, 
the precondition elements of competence and voluntariness. Second, the information 
elements of disclosure, recommendation, and understanding. Third, the consent 
elements of decision and authorisation. This paper focuses only on the element of 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
This goal labels Mill as a hedonist utilitarian. Other examples of utilities are: knowledge, 
health and understanding. Above n 2, 48. 
Above n 3, 26-28. 
J Katz and AM Capron Catastrophic Diseases: Who Decides What? (Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York, 1975)82-90. 
Above n 3, 28-31. 
Above n 3, 12 quoting Katz. 
Above n 2, 145-146. 
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information disclosure. Although Right 6 also covers informed consent in relation to 
research, this will not be considered in this paper as it is a vast issue on its own.12 
E Summary 
The impetus for the law on informed consent is the autonomy of the individual. 
Undoubtedly this impacts on health professionals and the community however this 
consideration must remain secondary. Autonomy must be the foremost measure 
against which actions implementing informed consent are assessed 
III JURISPRUDENCE ON INFORMED CONSENT 
A Introduction 
When the Code came into operation on 1 July 1996 it was not born into a vacuum. 
This section of this paper examines the legal context in relation to informed consent of 
which the Code now forms a part for New Zealand health services consumers. It is 
important to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of this system thus allowing the 
full implications of the Code to be measurable. 
B New Zealand Law 
Due to the bar on civil claims for personal injury under the various ACC Acts13 Smith 
v Auckland Area Health Board 14 is the only New Zealand case law on point. In Smith 
the judge was careful not to decide on the doctrine of informed consent except as it 
related to specific questions. Therefore it is necessary to look beyond New Zealand for 
a legal context. 
C International Law 
The doctrine of informed consent is a negligence action. Therefore the necessary 
elements of liability are the establishment of a duty of care, breach, causation, and 
damage. The legal consideration of informed consent concentrates primarily on two of 
these elements. The initial enquiry establishes the standard of care owed to the patient, 
this is followed by a determination of whether the breach of the duty was the cause of 
12 
13 
14 
See discussion in D Collins Medical Law in New ?£a/and (Brooker and Friend, Wellington, 
1992), eh 4. 
See discussion below part III D. 
[1965) NZLR 191 (CA). 
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the subsequent damage. There are two lines of international jurisprudence in the 
resolution of these issues. They revolve about the distinction between a doctor 
focused approach and a patient focused approach. The following section of this paper 
outlines the development of the common law internationally and some of the critical 
issues this uncovers. Other criticisms of the doctrine exist, however these will be 
discussed later in the paper as they relate directly to the Code. 
1 
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Professional focus: Establishing the duty of care 
(a) Overview of the law 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 15 set the precedent for the 
English standard of disclosure. McNair J stated that a doctor "is not guilty of 
negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
reasonable body of medical men skilled in that particular art"16. The House of 
Lords endorsed this in Sidaway v Royal Bethlem Hospital Governors. 11 Concisely 
stated the "law imposes the duty of care, but the standard of care is a matter of 
medical judgment".18 
The majority of Law Lords reserved a role for the Court in appraising the situation, 
even if it complied with the opinion of a "reasonable body of medical men". This 
was for the Court to conclude upon hearing the doctors evidence if the test was 
fulfilled. However, this would only override a doctor's professional assessment if 
the undisclosed risk was substantial and with "grave adverse consequences"19. 
Unfortunately this potential was quashed by subsequent interpretation in Gold v 
Haringey Area Health Authority.20 It was held that determination of the appropriate 
disclosure requirement is solely the role of the medical profession and not 
something that the Court can hold a contrary opinion on. 21 
[1957] 1 WLR 582; [1957] 2 All ER 118. For future references only the WLR report will be 
referred to. 
Above n 15, 587. 
[1985] 1 AC 871; [1985] 2 WLR 480; [1985] 1 All ER 643 (HL). For future references only 
the AC report will be referred to. 
Above n 17, 881. 
D Giesen and J Hayes "The Patient's Right to Know- A Comparative View" (1992) 21 
Anglo-Am LR 101, 103. 
[1988] QB 481; [1987] 3 WLR 649; [1988] 2 All ER 888. For future references only the 
WLR report will be referred to. 
Above n 20, 657. 
22 
23 
6 
(b) Regulation of medical practice 
These English cases reflect the value placed upon the doctor's duty to act in the best 
interests of the patient. Following this at the expense of patient autonomy indicates 
a paternalistic attitude which places recovery primary in the hands of the medical 
profession. 
The doctor focused standard is proposed as the most appropriate for the regulation 
of medical practice. There is validity to the claim that when judicial comment 
provides any internal regulation this goal is best served by a doctor focused test. 
This allows the profession to ensure that there is unified compliance with 
appropriate standards because they determine what the appropriate standards should 
be. The reality of a patient focused test is that "one can not know with certainty 
whether a consent is valid until a lawsuit has been filed and settled."22 Potentially 
this can undermine the regulatory value as pursuit of an established standard will 
not protect practitioners and concrete guidelines can not be given. 
However it is necessary to ask if this is the purpose of the disclosure requirements. 
Judicial comment in other jurisdictions proposes that this is the role of internal 
disciplinary bodies and societies, and not the role of a Court considering the 
doctrine of informed consent. 23 
The issue under consideration is a different issue than that involved where the question is 
whether the doctor carried out his professional activities by applicable professional 
standards. What is under consideration here is the patient's right to know what risks are 
involved in undergoing or foregoing certain surgery or other treatment. 
Informed consent in negligence actions is for the purpose of protecting individuals 
from violation. Impetus for the action lies with the complainant, not the good name 
and consistency of the medical profession. 
J F Merz "On a Decision-Making Paradigm of Medical Informed Consent" (1993) 14:2 
Journal of Legal Medicine 231 241, quoting Moore v Regents of the Univ. of California 51 
Cal . 3d 120, 165 n. 41. 
For example see Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 D.L.R 1, 13. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
7 
( c) Impediment to medicine development 
As reasoned in Sidaway, a doctor focused approach allows for the development of 
medicine. This implies that disclosure may result in the refusal of treatment. 
Following this argument through it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
doctrine of informed consent is being used as a limb of experimentation. As the 
extensive medico-legal material on clinical experimentation evidences, this is a 
contentious area. 24 
Again underlying this is a conflict of interests. Informed consent is primarily a right 
of autonomy, where "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body ... "25 and where the physician's 
duty is to the patient to disclose material risks. 26 Any duty to medical advancement 
must be secondary to the individual right of the patient when they may conflict. 
Discussed later is the absolute right to refuse medical treatment in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, this is relevant as it indicates the prioritisation of individual 
rights above benefits of medical development 27 
( d) Professional interests 
Underlying the doctor focused approach is a confidence in the medical profession's 
concern for the patient. This assumption was questioned in the US and Australian 
cases. King C J was influenced by this in F v R stating:28 
Practices may develop in professions, particularly as to disclosure, not because they serve 
the interests of the clients, but because they protect the interests or convenience of 
members of the profession. 
Judicial acknowledgement of this bias highlights the realities which should be 
borne in mind when considering what the focus of the standard of negligence 
should be. 
Above n 12. 
Schloedorff v Society of New York Hospital 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 
Above n 23, 5. 
See below part V B 2. 
F v R (1984) 33 SASR 189, 194. 
2 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
8 
Patient focus: Establishing the duty of care 
(a) Overview of the law 
Alternatively, the requisite disclosure is measured by the requirements of the patient 
instead of accepted medical practice. An objective standard is the usual tortious test 
for the reasonable duty of care one person owes to another. This is tempered in 
application by the particular circumstances of the case including special knowledge 
that the defendant may have.29 Objectivity is the undisputed standard on which the 
doctor is judged, however debate reigns over the informational requirements which 
the reasonable doctor must provide. 
A line of cases stemming from Canterbury v Spence30 affirm the dominance of the 
mythical "reasonable patient" in informed consent.31 Information about a risk is:32 
[M]aterial when a reasonable person in what the physician knows or should know to be the 
patients position, would likely attach significance to ... in deciding whether or not to forgo 
the proposed therapy. 
The test still asks what the reasonable course of action was for the doctor, but what 
is reasonable is measured in light of the requirements of the reasonable patient. 
Whether this occurred at law is to be determined by the legal fact finder. They must 
determine whether disclosure was adequate, and if it was not, they must determine 
whether liability should be imposed or if the suppression was morally justifiable.33 
In Reihl v Hughes34, the Canadian Supreme Court held that materiality is to be 
measured against all the circumstances of the case. Such an assessment was for the 
Court to make and was not concluded by the opinion of the medical profession. 
Medical evidence has an evidential role in this balance however it is not 
conclusive. 35 
S Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New aaland (The Law Book Cmp Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 259. 
464 F2d 772, (DC Cir 1972). 
Above n 28, 192. 
Above n 30, 787. 
It may be justified under professional privilege. For a discussion of this see I Kennedy and A 
Grubb Medical Law: Text With Materials (Butterworths, London, 1994), 211-215. 
Above n 23. 
The facts in this case clearly involved a material risk. The chance or a stroke or worse 
resultant from the procedure were at least 10%. The patient was aware only that be would be 
better off with surgery than without it, this presumption was not established by the facts . 
3 
36 
37 
9 
A considerable step was taken towards subjectivity in the recent Australian case 
Rogers v Whitaker36. Included in the factors that a physician should evaluate is the 
significance that the "particular patient" may attach to a risk if warned of it. This 
particular patient is unrestricted by requirements of reasonableness. Reiterating 
parts of F v R, the Court held that: the desire of the patient for information, the 
temperament and health of the patient, and the general surrounding circumstances 
were all relevant to the evaluation. 
The High Court of Australia in Rogers has individualised this further than in F v R 
by measuring "material" by both the reasonable person and the particular patient. 
The complainant who was blind in one eye and was especially concerned about her 
good eye being protected when her blind eye was operated on. Although she did 
not specifically question the risk to her remaining sight, she extensively queried the 
general risks. This affected the standard of disclosure owed to her. The Court held 
that this made the doctor aware of the significance this patient attached to the risk.37 
Although discussing the fact that this was relevant to the particular patient, the case 
was decided in accordance with the reasonable patient test. It was considered that 
the remaining sight would be material to a reasonable person in the complainant's 
situation. Therefore the use of the "particular patient" limb remains unclear. 
However it does indicate that in Australia, judicial attitude is open to a subjective 
standard 
Patient focus: Establishing causation 
(a) Overview of the law 
Causation is an essential element of tortious liability. Since Canterbury, it was 
required that the withheld information would have resulted in the damaging 
treatment being declined . In both Canterbury and Reihl this was asserted as an 
objective test. The doctor is negligent only if the reasonable patient would have 
declined treatment if the risk was revealed. To mitigate the harshness of this the 
patient should be a reasonable patient in the position of the actual patient Although 
subjective approaches have been suggested, they have been rejected on policy 
(1992) 175 C.L.R. 479. There is evidence of a subjective standard in some European case 
law, especially in Gennany and Switzerland where patients retain their "absolute discretion" 
even if it is unreasonable, untenable or inappropriate. See D Giesen International Medical 
Malpractice Law: A Comparative Law Study of Civil Liability Arising From Medical Care 
(Martinus Nijhoff Pub, Dordreht, 1988) 110-122. 
Above n 36, 487. 
38 
39 
40 
41 
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grounds. Subjective standards are thought to expose the doctor to the hindsight of 
an injured person.38 
It is at this point that Rogers diverges markedly. The patient's subjective evidence 
as to the effect that the information would have had on her decision was accepted. It 
was held that this evidence is subject only to the Court's belief in its truthfulness 
and not its reasonableness. 39The causation issue was dealt with by the trial judge 
who found credible the complainant's evidence that she would not have undertaken 
the surgery if the risk to her good eye had been disclosed. This finding was 
affirmed in the NS Supreme Court.40 The High Court did not consider it. Thus the 
Australian position on causation is subjective. 
( b) Difficulties in separating materiality and causation 
Imposing an objective test at the point of causation can vitiate the finding of 
materiality. This occurs for two reasons. 
First, it is difficult to assess what the reasonable patient would have done. 
Physicians suggest certain procedures as they believe them to be the best option, as 
the people with the most expansive medical knowledge, their opinion as to what the 
reasonable cause of action was has substantial influence on determining what 
would have been medically reasonable in law. The claimant has a high burden to 
discharge to demonstrate why he or she would have reasonably chosen another 
option, contrary to medical opinion. 
Interestingly, the Canadian Courts are applying this test in an manner which further 
devalues the specific patient. Conclusions are often drawn that a reasonable patient 
with trust and confidence in their doctor would likely have followed their advice 
anyway.41 This is inconsistent with the policy in Reihl. In cases of non malicious 
suppression, this begins to look similar to "good medical practice", the professional 
focus test the court was rejecting. 
Above n 23, 16. 
The more reasonable the belief the easier it will be to discharge the evidential burden. 
Rogers v Whitaker [1991] 23 NSWLR 600, 619. 
Merz J F and G Robertson "Informed Consent Ten Years Later: The Impact of Reibl v 
Hughes" (1991) 70 The Can Bar R 423, 433-434. 
D 
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In addition, evidence points to patients misunderstanding the options and risks 
explained to them.42 This affects their ab1lity to make an objectively reasonable 
decision. The writer queries whether other lay people, importantly juries and 
judges, are sufficiently devoid of these difficulties to enable them to assess what the 
reasonable course of action was. In demanding an objective test the Courts are 
demonstrating a belief in objectively correct responses. Patients do not necessarily 
think in this way. Neither do juries and judges. There is an element of myth making 
in this enquiry. 
Second, fundamental to a finding of materiality is acceptance that the information is 
reasonably significant to the patient. To be significant the information must surely 
be something that they consider useful in the task of assessing their options and the 
decision they must make. Information withheld from a patient must therefore be 
information of this type to be considered material. Thus considerations of whether 
the undisclosed information would have influenced the patient's decision to 
undergo the procedure that caused them injury has already been answered under the 
first limb. The need to readdress this in terms of causation produces the effect of 
having the Court look for evidence of extra reliance on the non disclosure than is 
necessary. As a result material information which the patient may be deemed to 
have the legal right to may not be enforceable because the reasonable patient would 
not have declined the treatment on that basis.43 This is the way the jurisprudence in 
the area has operated. Twerski and Cohen noted:44 
[11he combined effect of the standards of disclosure and causation is that, for all practical 
purposes, a patient is only entitled to information which would lead a reasonable patient to 
choose against the doctor's recommended therapy. 
Again this begins to look similar to the good medical practice test rejected in 
Canterbury. 
Negligence zn New Zealand and The Accident 
Compensation Scheme 
Negligence in New Zealand is pursuable primarily through the Accident 
Compensation Corporation scheme (ACC), because s 14 of the ARCIA currently bars 
42 
43 
44 
Tweski A D and N B Cohen "Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of 
Justiciable Causation" [1988] U Ill L Rev 607, 626. This article outlines some of the logical 
errors patients make in assessing information they are provided with. 
Above n 22, 250 and 254. 
Above n 42, 615. 
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civil actions for injury covered by the Act. As discussed below this covers negligence 
in the area of informed consent. However the bar is such that in there may be scope 
for civil action in cases where there is no physical injury, such as where the damage is 
mental or economic. On occasion there may also be actions for exemplary damages. 
This is to "punish the defendant for high handed disregard of the plaintiff's rights or 
the like outrageous conduct".45 Still, most informed consent considerations in New 
Zealand have been within the ACC arena. 
1 The Accident Compensation Acts of 1972 and 1982 
Although the original wording of the 1972 Act did not directly refer to medical 
misadventure, this was amended before the Act came into operation. Section 8 stated: 
Personal injury by accident-
(a) Includes-
(ii) medical, surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure. 
This provision was continued without alteration in the 1982 Act. For this period the 
legal debate revolved around the existence of medical misadventure.46 
Up until 1990 the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority (ACAA) refused to accept 
that medical misadventure could be found solely for examples of informed consent In 
Gosling v ACC 47it was queried whether an eventuated risk that was too common to 
constitute misadventure should become misadventure because of lack of informed 
consent. The authority had difficulty accepting that it should. 
However it is now clear that negligence does fall within medical misadventure.48 Thus 
it is under this head that informed consent was pursued with more success following 
1990. The leading case is H v ACC.49 The ratio statements in that judgment affirmed 
the decision in Smith v Auckland Area Health Board that there is a duty of due care 
upon the doctor to answer an express question from the patient This had been widely 
accepted prior to this judgment, however it was the obiter statements with regard to a 
wider duty which were important. The Court held that a prudent gynaecologist would 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
See Donselaar v Donselaar [1982) 1 NZLR 97. Green v MaJheson [1989) 3 NZLR 564. 
See generally Collins above n 12, 54-57,141-160, and M Vennell Informed Consent or 
Reasonable Disclosure of Risks: The Relevance of an Informed Patient in the Light of the 
New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme [1987) NZLR 160. 
[1990) NZAR 76. 
See Re P ACAA Decision 2/89, Polansky v ACC [1990) NZAR 481, and Collins above n 
12, 145-146. 
[1990) NZAR 289. 
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have warned the patient of the risk of the sterilisation operation failing. The test 
adopted was that in Sidaway. This case has subsequently been affirmed.50 
In the 1993 case Smith v ACC51 , the courts laid out the elements for an action in 
informed consent in that case. Stating: 
In order to establish medical misadventure through lack of informed consent the appellant must 
show: 
1 Either that a duty of care was owed by the doctor to inform the appellant before the 
operation of the possibility of failure and that the doctor was in breach of thaJ duty, or 
2 There is a duty upon a doctor to use care in answering questions put to him or her when 
the doctor knows that reliance is being placed on that answer, and the doctor has 
breached that duty. 
3 And in addition to proof of a duty of care and a breach of that duty, the appellant must 
persuade, on the balance of probabilities, that the damage sujfered, .. .is casually 
connected with the breach of duty. (emphasis added) 
All the elements of the tort of negligence were required. In this case the breach of duty 
was not at issue because the judge was unable to accept the evidence that the patient 
was not informed of the risk. Thus nothing was said to alter the applicable test from 
Sidaway. However it was the consideration of causation which is of most interest. In 
the alternative the judge concluded that there was no proof that the patient would have 
forgone the treatment even if disclosure had been made. In a memorandum to the 
parties concerning the decision he wrote:52 
I am also in some doubt that Mr Smith would not have undergone the procedure as he has 
unfortunately suffered from ear problems for at least part of his life and I would consider that he 
would, being a prudent person, follow specialist medical advice in an endeavour to remove his 
ear problem. (emphasis added) 
This is similar to some developments in the Canadian law,53 and it highlights the 
difficulties that a doctor focused test has in affirming the autonomy of the individual. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
For example see Hazel v ACC [1991] NZAR 362 and Davie v ACC [1993] NZAR 1. 
[1993] NZAR 490. 
Above n 51 , 491. 
See above part III C 3 (b). 
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2 Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 
The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (ARCIA), s 5 (6) provides: 
A failure to obtain informed consent to treatment .. .is medical misadventure only if the 
registered health professional acted negligently in failing to obtain informed consent. 
There is no practical difference between this and the test applied under the earlier Acts. 
They were focusing on a duty of care, that duty being the gatekeeper of a negligence 
action. 
There have been no reported cases on informed consent under this Act 
3 Summary 
ACC has restricted the development of common law in New Zealand. However 
negligence is in fact necessary to qualify under the scheme. As such it has evolved its 
own jurisprudence, which so far has reflected the professional focused test. 
E Conclusion 
There is a clear division between the North American/Australian approach and the 
English approach. The former focuses upon the needs of the patient, with further 
debate about the degree of subjectivity allowed, whilst the later focuses upon the 
reasonable actions of the doctor according to his or her peers. Prior to the inception of 
the HDCA and the Code, New Zealand was free to follow either the approach. 
Although the Judge, now Justice Cartwright, encouraged the later in her report into 
the treatment of Cervical Cancer at National Women's Hospital (the Cartwright 
Report):54 
54 
I consider that the New Zealand Courts, if they bad been freed from the constraints imposed by 
the Accident Compensation Act 1972 and its amendments, would be more likely to follow the 
Australian example ... Tbe focus should be centred on the patient's rights and not to protect the 
doctor from liability. 
The Repon Of The Committee Of Inquiry Into Allegations Concerning The Treatment Of 
Cervical Cancer At National Women's Hospital And Into Other Related Matters (Auckland, 
1988) 136. 
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This is also the approach of the Medical Council who require that the information 
disclosed should reflect what a prudent patient in that patient's situation would expect, 
and more specifically the actual knowledge of the patient and the practitioner.55 This 
approach is more consistent with the autonomy of the patient. However both 
approaches have fallen short of providing the individual with sufficient information to 
effect a fully considered decision. 
IV HEALTH AND DISABILITY COMMISSIONER ACT 1995 
A Background 
In 1988 the now Justice Cartwright, presented her report on the treatment of cervical 
cancer at National Women's Hospital. Included in her recommendations and findings 
were the suggestions that a statement of patient rights should be implemented and a 
health Commissioner established. She envisaged the Commissioner's role to include; 
negotiating and mediating over complaints, heightening professional understanding of 
patient rights and the provision of rulings and sanctions. 56 This report that was the 
main impetus for the HDCA.57 The purpose of the Act is to promote and protect the 
rights of health and disability services consumers, and, to that end facilitate the fair, 
speedy and efficient resolution of complaints relating to infringement of those 
rights".58 
B Introduction to the Code Of Health And Disability Services 
Consumers' Rights 
Central to the operation of the HDCA is the Code Of Health And Disability Services 
Consumers' Rights (the Code). It is a breach of the Code which the redress 
procedures set out to remedy. The first priority of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner was to prepare a draft Code in accordance with the requirements of ss 
19 and 20 of the Act. This procedure was begun in 1995 and consisted of two rounds 
of consultation and preparation of draft Codes. On 1 July 1996 the final Code came 
into effect. It is contained in regulations to the Act.59 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Above n 12, 59-60, and Medical Council of New Zealand A Statement for the Medical 
Profession on Information and Consent (Wellington, 1995). See discussion below part 
VD 3 (a). 
Above n 54, 214. 
(1994) 543 NZPD 4299, the Hon Katherine O'Reagan on the third reading of the Bill. 
Health and Disability Commissioner Draft Code of Health and Disability Consumers' Rights 
(Wellington, 1995). 
Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' 
Rights) Regulations 1996. 
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C Operation of the Act 
Resolution of disputes for a breach of the Code is available at five levels.6° Consistent 
with the desire to resolve disputes at the lowest level possible, these options are 
largely progressive, although complaints can be instigated with the advocate or 
Commissioner61 and instigated by the Commissioner herself62• 
These levels are as follows: 
• Level 1. Self advocacy using the Code as a tool. 
• Level 2. Advocacy assistance either to approach the provider or to make a 
complaint to the Commissioner. 63 
• Level 3. Commissioner to decide whether to pursue the complaint, and if so to 
investigate whether it constitutes a breach of the Code.64 Disciplinary bodies may 
be notified. 65 
• Level 4. Further option of referring to advocacy. 66 
• Level 5. Complaints Review Tribunal hearing,67 where a wide range of remedies 
may be sought. These include: declarations, restraining orders, damages, 
performance to redress loss or damage, or, other relief as the Tribunal sees fit. 68 
V 
A 
THE OPERATION OF INFORMED CONSENT WITHIN 
THE HEALTH AND DISABILITY COMMISSIONER ACT 
1995 
Introduction 
The following section provides an interpretation of Right 6 drawing from a 
combination of common law, specific statutory enactments and the principles which 
found informed consent. 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
(1994) 543 NZPD, 3735. As staled by the Hon. K O'Reagan, then Assistant Minister of 
Health. 
HDCA s 31. 
HDCA s 35 (2). 
HDCA s 30 (i). 
HDCA s 36. 
HDCA s 38. 
HDCA s42. 
HDCA s 50. 
HDCA s 54. 
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Right 6 lends itself to be examined in parts, however in doing so the whole must be 
kept in mind. No Right or portion of a Right exists which does not impact on the rest. 
Reading Right 6 this way provides avenues for the consumer to attain a level of 
autonomy not effected by the common law doctrine of informed consent. Where 
previously the rhetoric of informed consent has dominated the doctrine, the Code 
allows the real implementation. 
B "Reasonable Consumer in that Consumer's Circumstances" 
1 Background 
The "reasonable consumer in that consumer's circumstance" is the focal unit for Right 
6. It is used as a gatekeeper in both Right (1) and (2). When the term was introduced 
to Right 6 (1) of the Code, "in that consumer's circumstance" was described as the 
element through which the information can be "tailored" to the individual needs of the 
patient.69 This description does not mirror the meaning of this phrase in at common 
law. Whilst still connected to a standard that incorporates the reasonable consumer, the 
consumer remains a generalised image of the particular patient 
However expanding the test to a "reasonable patient in that patient's circumstances" 
has allowed the Courts scope for looking at individual requirements. For example, in 
Reihl the complainant had to acquire another year and a half of experience at his 
workplace to qualify for a life pension. The Court considered this relevant to the 
disclosure owed to him, especially since there was no immediate need for the surgery 
to be performed before this period elapsed. This still falls below the particular patient 
test. It still requires the information to be reasonable. 
2 Inconsistencies between the right to refuse medical treatment 
and the right to adequate information 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights), s 11 affirms the right 
to refuse medical treatment. This is repeated in Right 7 (7) of the Code. Neither 
provision imposes any duty to exercise this right reasonably. This affirms the position 
at common law.70 Most competent adults71 are free to refuse medical intervention on 
purely subjective grounds. As stated in Smith:72 
69 
70 
Office of the Minister for Health: Media release Amendments to the Draft Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Rights (Wellington, 30 April 1996), 3. 
Above n 14, 191, and Re S [1992] 1 NZLR 363 for comment on the Bill of Rights 
affirrning the common law. For examples of common law see; R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 
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An individual patient...must always retain the right to decline operative investigation or treatment 
however unreasonable or foolish this may appear in the eyes of bis [or her] medical advisors. 
In Malette v Shulman 73 the complainant was brought to hospital unconscious 
following a car accident. She was carrying a Jehovah's Witness card stating that she 
refused blood transfusions under all circumstances. The doctor, unsure of his 
obligations in the circumstances, proceeded with the transfusion necessary to save her 
life. As a consequence he was sued and had damages awarded against him. In the 
judgment the Court stated that the doctor had no right to assess the reasonableness of 
the refusal as long as the instruction were clear. It is implicit that the refusal is not one 
that the Court or doctor would consider reasonable in those circumstances. Thus the 
beliefs of the complainant were protected by the subjective nature of the right to refuse 
treatment. 
However consider a situation where the consumer is a Jehovah's Witness. The doctor 
is aware of her religion but nothing had been said or asked about blood products. 
There is a very small risk that the procedure being most seriously considered may 
require a blood transfusion. The chance is so minimal and so easily remedied that 
disclosure would not normally be expected. The risk transpires and as a result of the 
person's refusal they are injured. The Court considering whether the disclosure of 
information was adequate would have to ask if the reasonable consumer in that 
consumer's circumstance would have attached significance to the risk sufficient to 
render it material. It would be inconsistent for the Court to define a belief that they 
label unreasonable in relation to refusing treatment, as reasonable for the purposes of 
disclosure. 
Therefore transposing current legal definitions into the Code will render Right 6 
inconsistent with the subjective right in s 11 of the Bill of Rights. It could result in a 
subjective right to refuse a procedure, but only an objective right to know that it could 
be a choice you may have to make. Without this information the consumer can not 
fully assess their options. 
71 
72 
73 
1411, Re T(adult: refusal of treatment) [1992) 4 All ER 649, Re W(a minor) (medical 
treatment) [1992) 4 All ER 627, (all Jehovah witness cases). 
There are examples of this being overridden if the patient is pregnant. See above n 33, 342-
400. This is an issue in the UK at present following two publicised examples of women 
being subject to caesarean despite their refusal of the procedure. These have been situations 
where the women have not been mentally disordered, but where the child would be endangered 
by natural birth. See discussion of this in B Hewson "Women's Rights and Legal Wrongs" 
[1996) New Law J 1385. 
Above n 14, 191. 
(1991) 2 Med LR 162. 
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3 Using the Bill of Rights: A new interpretation of "reasonable" 
The Bill of Rights provides a tool for the Commissioner to develop the Code to 
remedy this inconsistency. The phrase "reasonable consumer in that consumer's 
circumstance" is far from clearly expressed. If a statutory provision can be read 
consistently with the Bill of Rights, s 6 requires that it must be. As Rishworth 
noted:74 
Wherever there is the possibility of reading down [the Bill of Rights], the Court is faced with 
more than one possible meaning. An interpretative choice must be made, and the mandatory 
instruction in s 6 applies: the Court "shall prefer" the consistent meaning. 
When legal focus is on the consumer's requirements as it is in the rest of the Code, 
then they are entitled to information to furnish this decision. The phrase "reasonable 
consumer in that consumer's circumstance" can be read consistently with this, by 
rendering it consistent with s 11 of the Bill of Rights. 
The writer argues that "reasonable" could be interpreted as a responsibility on the 
consumer to alert the doctor to their particular concerns. This is completely different 
from a value judgement on the reasonableness of those concerns. If defined this way 
there exists no impediment to imposing a subjective standard into the Code akin to the 
particular patient focus in Rogers. 
This argument is more consistent with the purpose of the Code and the other 
provisions than the meaning given in the case law . Right 4 (3) ensures the right to 
services of an appropriate standard and provides: 
(3) Every consumer has the rights to have services provided in a manner consistent with his or 
her needs. 
"Services" is defined in reg 4, to include health care procedures. Right 4 (3) is clearly 
subjective and imposes a duty on the provider to regard the patient as an individual and 
to provide for them as such. This is further guaranteed in Right 3; the Right to Dignity 
and Independence. Right 5 (2) encourages an environment where the consumer can 
74 G Huscroft and P Rishworth Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and The Human Rights Act 1993 (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) 107. See also Knight 
v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991) 2 NZLR 30, at 43. 
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communicate freely. Ideally this will enable consumers to bring their particular 
circumstances to the notice of the health provider. If this occurs there is no need for 
the imposition of any objective test. The doctor will not be required to read the 
patient's mind as communication between them will be sufficient to inform him or her. 
Further the patient is required to act reasonably towards the provider which will 
necessarily involve the disclosure of adequate information for their particular concerns 
to be obvious. This is a lower test than requiring direct questions. Asking the right 
questions often involves a level of knowledge that the consumer does not have. If this 
still looks to subject the provider to excessive disclosure, Right 10 (3), the defence of 
resource and clinical restraints can be utilised. 
Therapeutic privilege need not be affected by this interpretation because Right 10 (3) 
allows for defences when clinical circumstances requires. 
Therefore, Right 6 should be interpreted as subjectively as statutory interpretation 
allows. The writer argues that this can be an extremely subjective approach. The 
remainder of this section involves an analysis of the rest of Right 6. For these 
discussions the interpretation of "reasonable" consumer is not the focus, instead the 
focus is upon the specific types of information that must be disclosed. Under either 
interpretation, the Code takes the rights of the health services consumer beyond the 
common law. 
C 
1 
Right 6 (2): The Right to Informed Consent 
(2) Before making a choice or giving consent, every consumer has the right to the information 
that a reasonable consumer, in that consumer's circumstance, needs to make an informed choice 
or give informed consent 
Relationship with the doctrine of informed consent 
Right 6 (2) sets the standard of disclosure of information for the purposes of informed 
consent. This is the only provision that refers directly to the requisite standard of 
disclosure for this purpose. The provision refines the requirements to that which are 
necessary to "make an informed choice or give informed consent". The definition of 
this phrase is not developed within the Code. The drafters made it clear that this was 
worded to "enable the detail of what is required to evolve and develop over time"75. 
75 Health and Disability Commissioner Draft Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers' Rights: Consultation Summary (Wellington, 1995) 33. 
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Ostensibly, the Commissioner is constrained by Right 7 (1) which links Right 6 (2) to 
the common law: 
(1) Services may be provided to a consumer only if that consumer makes an informed choice 
and gives informed consent, except where any enactment, or the comnwn law, or any other 
provision of this Code provides otherwise. (emphasis added) 
This appears to introduce all the defences that the common law provides against a 
claim of inadequate disclosure. This could equate to invoking the common law tests if 
these are lower than the standard in the Code. However the writer argues that this 
overstates the importance and intent of this provision. Right 7 is intended to cover 
situation where consent is unnecessary and not situations where the information that 
needs to be disclosed is questioned. The Commissioner clarifies her intention in the 
commentary to Right 7 in the first draft, "the issue of what "informed" means is dealt 
with in Right 6"76_ 
In the first draft the exceptions listed in Right 7 (1) were restricted to statutory 
enactment or the doctrine of necessity. It was suggested that the doctrine of necessity 
should be allowed to develop in line with the common law.77 It appears that the 
extension of Right 7 (1) from statutory law to common law was made with this in 
mind.78 A wider consequence was not intended. 
Alternatively, it can be argued that the meaning of the term "common law" is 
ambiguous. The common law provides no definitive answer with regards to 
information disclosure. 79 Therefore defining which line of cases to implement under 
Right 7 (1) is a question of statutory interpretation. This will invoke the Bill of 
Rights.80 It will also require the provision to be interpreted consistently with the rest 
of the Code, especially those which encourage a personalised view of the consumer 
and their needs. Both these factors skew the relevant common law in favour of the 
subjective interpretation in Rogers.81 The Commissioner will only be restricted by the 
interpretation given to the "reasonable consumer in that consumer's circumstance". 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Above n 58, 35. 
Above n 75, 37. 
See Correspondence from P Skegg to K Poutasi concerning the Draft Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Right 12 December 1995, Ministry of Health file ADl0-23-
5#2. referring to the Consultation Summary above n 75,37. 
See above part III C. 
See above part VB 3. 
See above parts III C 2 (a) and III C 3. 
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2 The placement of the provision 
The primacy of this provision is disguised by its placement as following Right 6 (1). 
The Ministry of Health was advised that the order should be reversed. 82 This did not 
eventuate. The effect is that Right 6 (2) appears to be the safety net that follows Right 
6 (1) and the specific examples of information that should be disclaimed to 
consumers. 
Another suggestion was merging the provisions. The first Cabinet Social Policy 
Committee paper actually did so stating that:83 
(6)(a) Before making a choice or giving consent, every consumer has the right to receive the 
information needed by a reasonable consumer, in that consumer's circumstance, to make an 
informed choice or give informed consent, including-
This suggestion was strongly opposed by the Commissioner who argued that it 
undermined the wider scope of Right 6 (1).84 Relating Right 6 (1) to informed 
consent eliminates its operation in situations where a choice is not being made. The 
Commissioner always intended Right 6 (1) to extend to all consumers and not just 
those making a choice. In this correspondence she gave the example of consumers 
who are not capable of giving consent on their own behalf such as children or those 
with intellectual handicaps, but who are entitled to the information. The merger was 
abandoned and the provision enacted in its present form. 85 
This will affect the way that the Code influences informed consent in New Zealand 
because Right 6 (1) is the leading enactment for the disclosure of information to health 
services consumers. 
82 
83 
84 
85 
Correspondence from R Paterson to K Poutasi concerning the Draft Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Right 19 December 1995, Ministry of Health file ADI0-23-
5#2. Correspondence from P Skegg to K Poutasi concerning the Draft Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Right 12 December 1995, Ministry of Health file ADI0-23-
5#2. Correspondence from Crown Law Office to H Lockyer concerning the Draft Code of 
Health and Disability Services Consumers' Right 16 January 1996, Ministry of Health file 
ADI0-23-5#2. 
Cabinet Social Policy Committee Draft Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers' Right: Proposed Amendments, 12 S PC (96) (Wellington, 19 February 1996). 
Correspondence from R Stent, Health and Disability Commissioner to H Lockyer, 27 
February 1996, Ministry of Health file ADI0-23-5#4. 
Cabinet Social Policy Committee Draft Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers' Right, S PC (96) 19 (Wellington, 4 March 1996). 
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Right 6 (]): The right to disclosure of information: 
Drafting history 
(1) Every consumer has the right to the information that a reasonable consumer, in that 
consumer's circumstance, would expect to receive, including-
Right (1) specifically requires that all consumers have the right to information that the 
reasonable consumer in that consumers circumstances would expect to receive. This 
includes an explanation of the options available, an assessment of the risks, side 
effects, benefits and costs. It extends to consumers who are not being asked to make a 
choice. Right 6 (1) is intended to set up a minimal set of information which the 
consumer is entitled to by virtue of being a consumer and not by virtue of being 
required to exercise a choice. 86 
However the information listed in Right 6 (1) is primarily of the kind that someone 
exercising informed consent would expect to receive. Thus Right 6 (1) is practically 
about informed consent, but in strict terms the breach of this provision would 
constitute a breach of the rights of disclosure and not a breach of informed consent 
requirements under the Code. This may protect it from interference from the common 
law under Right 7 (1). 
The details of this provision are further complicated by the addition of the reasonable 
person standard in the final Code. This is different from the wording of the final draft. 
The final draft proposed that the information required by right 6 (1) would be an 
absolute minimum package for all consumers, stating, "Every consumer has the right 
to receive without asking-". 87 This was not a disclosure fettered by a test of 
reasonableness. 
Therefore worded this way, Right 6 (1) can not have been intended to reach as widely 
as the requirements of informed consent. It would be nonsensical to require that all 
consumers are entitled to all the information about the procedure that is listed. Any 
study of the case law on informed consent would have illuminated the distance 
between the common law and this standard.88 Because the actual scope of this 
information was left open, the Court would have had to interpret it in context,89 with 
the context revealing its practical limitations. This is further evidenced by the existence 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Above n 75, 33. 
Above n 75, 33. 
See above Part III C. 
J F Burrows Statutory Interpretation in New z:ealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) eh 9, 
especially 125-143. 
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of an informed consent provision in what is now Right 6 (2) of the draft Code and the 
intention of the Commissioner that the Rights be read together. This reinforces the 
original interpretation of Right 6 (1) as a list of minimum requirements. 
Unfortunately the relative clarity of the purpose of this provision was clouded by the 
addition of the reasonable test in the final Code. The absolute right to information in 
the draft did not have precisely represented the intention of the Commissioner. This 
left a gap for legal exploitation which the drafters acted to close.90 The primary 
concern turned on Right 6 (l)(b) which required disclosures of options and their 
associated risks. The Ministry were advised that this could result in situations where 
the doctor would be obliged to give information about alternative treatments that they 
did not think would assist the consumer or that the provider knows little about.91 
Examples quoted were "local steroids versus acupuncture versus Chinese herbal 
medicine" .92 The Commissioner reasoned that clause 3 excuses that provider from 
giving advice beyond their reasonable area of knowledge.93 The changes were made 
anyway. 
The standard was lowered from being absolute to being conditional upon objective 
and subjective consideration of reasonableness. However in doing so they rendered 
the provision similar to the wording of the doctrine of informed consent as long 
debated by the courts. Thus it began to look like a more liberal interpretation of the 
standard for informed consent. This is escalated by its operation in the same context as 
the doctrine of informed consent. 
Prior to the final alterations, breaching Right 6 (1) may not have been synonymous 
with a breach of the requirements of informed consent. But now the introduction of 
the reasonableness test must allow for extension of the provision to people in the 
circumstance of making a decision, and as such render the scope of the information 
consistent with the necessary disclosure for that situation. Anyone who is exercising a 
choice is covered by Right 6 (1) by virtue of being a consumer. The fact that they are 
at a point where a choice needs to be exercised, is squarely within the scope of "that 
consumers circumstance". Thus the need to make an informed consent, secured by 
Right 7, is directly relevant to the degree of information provided for in Right 6 (1). 
The drafters assert that none of the rights are to be considered in isolation and this 
90 
91 
92 
93 
Above n 69, 3-4. 
Above n 78, comments from P Skeggs. 
Correspondence from H Lockyer to M Luey at the Health and Disability Commissioner's 
Office concerning the Draft Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Right 16 
January 1996, Ministry of Health file ADl0-23-5#3. 
Above n 75, 33. 
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endorses the conclusion that Rights 6 (1) and (2) apply to the same people, and 
impose the same standard. Right 6 (1) elaborates on the substance of the disclosure, 
but it still leaves a wide discretion for the fact finder to decide upon. However the 
listed information should guide Right 6 (2), and both provisions should be used in an 
integrated way. 
E The Contents of Right 6 (1) 
Right (2) may embody the standard of care espoused by the Common law in the 
American and Australian jurisdictions, it may also be the leading provision in strict 
terms of informed consent, however the impact of Right (1) substantially alters the 
content of the doctrine of informed consent for the purposes of the Code. Previous 
case law has consistently stated that informed consent sterns from the rights of the 
patient to self determination. Unfortunately in reality this goal is often relegated to the 
pursuit of redressing personal injury. Tweski and Cohen wrote in 1988 that:94 
The legal system should protect these rights and provide significant recompense for their 
invasion, rather they continue the singleminded and ill considered attention to personal injury 
allegedly caused by the lack of information. 
A focus on physical injury is a very different thing to the protection of autonomy. This 
inconsistency in goals is demonstrated in most of the leading cases. Katz suggested in 
197795 that the Court gives autonomy its separate due and then proceeds with reality 
of medical, legal and human life. Perhaps this avoidance follows from the practical 
fact that those who go to the expensive and bother of litigation do so only when the 
rewards will warrant the effort.96 The law in relation to damages dictates that these 
will be cases of personal injury, where the more tragic the consequence the larger the 
payment. This necessarily affects causation and materiality. When the claim hinges on 
lack of disclosure, causation will be easier found if the actual risk that eventuated was 
not disclosed. Commentators argue that this is not the only approach open to the 
judiciary,97 however it is the one that has been widely accepted. Subsequently the 
doctrine of informed consent is often a duty to warn as opposed to a right to be 
informed.98 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Above n 42, 609. 
Above n 1, 139. 
Above n 42, 616. 
See part VE. 
Above n 1, 172. 
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There is much criticism of the tortious backdrop of negligence law in the medical 
setting.99 The Code is the first international initiative to provide for the rights of health 
consumers in a forum which focuses solely on the entitlements of the individual. The 
purpose of the Code is to provide for the independence, respect and autonomy of 
consumers. The purpose of Right 6 is solely to allow for decision making. The focus 
is not the imposition of liability but the encouragement of fair information. This is 
assisted by the lack of a causation requirement and the intention of the legislature to 
provide a system of redress that focuses on restoration of autonomy and 
acknowledgement of wrongs instead of monetary compensation. As such Right 6 (1) 
widens the scope of redress well beyond that of the common law. Following is a 
comparison of the information expected under Right 6 (1) and that which the doctrine 
of informed consent at common law guarantees. 
1 An explanation of his or her condition and the results of 
procedures and tests 
(a) An explanation of his or her condition; and ... 
(f) The results of tests; and ... 
(g) The results of procedures. 
This information is part of the minimum package owed to the consumer. Case law has 
seldom reached this standard. Shultz illustrates the legal preoccupation with proposed 
physical touching, that is disclosure of information that precedes a limited range of 
proposed procedures of an invasive nature. In Kelton v District of Columbia 100 the 
complainant had undergone a caesarean section 6 years earlier and subsequently was 
unable to conceive. Further surgical investigation revealed that the reason for this was 
scarring which occurred during the caesarean. The complainant had never been told of 
this damage. The Court rejected the doctrine of informed consent holding that since 
there was no proposed "risky operation" the doctrine did not apply. The complainants 
in Roark v Allenl01 were parents of a child delivered by forceps. Although the doctors 
considered the possibility of skull fracture at the time of birth they dismissed it and 
never mentioned anything about it to the parents. Only later were the fractures 
discovered. Again the doctrine of informed consent was rejected. Professional 
negligence was pursued in Roark however this cause of action it entirely ignores the 
99 
100 
IOI 
For example see M Shultz "From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected 
Interest" (1985) 95 Yale LJ 219. 
413 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1980). 
633 SW 2d 804 (Tex. 1982). 
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element of patient autonomy and decides instead in accord with the behaviour of the 
professional in the eyes of their colleagues. 
Extending informed consent to these situations may at first appear inconsistent the 
informed consent doctrine until the actual position of the complainants is assessed. In 
both cases the complainants were in a situation where they had a choice to make. If 
told earlier about her condition and the results of the procedure the woman in Kelton 
could have undergone corrective surgery. At least, armed with the knowledge of her 
condition she would have had the option not to undergo further investigative surgery. 
Because this information was held from her she was unaware that she even was in a 
position of choice. If informed of the possibility of fracture in Roark the parents could 
have got a second opinion and treatment following the birth. As they were unaware of 
the chance of injury they were deprived of this choice. 
The Code would not allow these type of results. It is clear that the consumer must be 
told of results of tests and procedures, and given an explanation of their condition, or 
of the child they exercise consent over, to the standard of a reasonable consumer in 
that consumers circumstance. This conclusion is bolstered by Right 6 (3)(c) which 
ensures that the consumer can ask for a second opinion. Sufficient information to 
effect this option must be provided under right 6 (1). Further Right 5 (2) guarantees 
an environment between the consumer and provider which enables them both to 
communicate openly, honestly and effectively. Again this points to the communication 
being such that it provides enough information for the consumer to ask for a second 
opinion if it is reasonable. The Code is similar to the attitude of the Court in Gates v 
Jensen 102 The complainant's test results suggested possible glaucoma but their doctor 
decided against responding to it or mentioning it to the them. This was decided on the 
basis of the doctor's possession of knowledge, and established a new test that any 
information possessed by the doctor about an abnormality in the patient's body must 
be disclosed. 103 
2 
102 
103 
Options, risks and side effects and benefits 
(b) An explanation of the options available, including an assessment of the expected risks, side 
effects, benefits, and costs of each option ... 
92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P. 2d 919 (1979) Wash Sup Crt. 
This was affirmed in Truman v Thomas 27 Cal 3d 285, 611 P 2d 902, 165 Cal Rptr 308 
(1980). See above n 99. 
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The information contained in Right 6 (l)(b) can be divided into two categories: 
information about risks other than the one that eventuated, and information about 
alternatives to treatment. As a result of a personal injury focus both of these have been 
undermined in the case law. However the appropriateness of this depends upon the 
aim that the courts are wishing to pursue. As Weisbard discusses: 104 
[F]ailure to disclose other risks (or other comparative treatments) which do not materialize can 
skew the patient's comparative assessment of alternative courses of action, thus resulting in an 
injury that would have been avoided if full disclosure bad been made and another alternative 
pursued. The law's failure to permit recovery on such cases further demonstrates that its 
primary focus is on the physicians duty to disclose, rather than on any duty to facilitate 
informed patient choice among alternative courses of action. 
( a) Treatment of other risks at common law 
Tweski thus argues that whilst personal injury is the focus, single eventuated risks 
will be the predominant ground for action. This is evidenced as early as Canterbury 
which defined materiality as: 105 
Optimally for a patient, exposure of a risk would be mandatory whenever the patient would 
deem it significant to bis decision either singly or in combination with other risks. 
(emphasis added) 
However it then goes on to require that the undisclosed risk be of the kind of the 
damage that resulted. 106 Therefore, although material information could include 
alternatives and risks which may have dissuaded the patient, causation limits 
liability for non disclosure to risks which eventuated."[F]or otherwise the omission 
however unpardonable, is legally without consequence". I07 
Even in situations as extreme as failing to disclosure the risk of death, the Courts 
have held that as that risk did not eventuate the failure was not sufficient to trigger 
liability. 108 
104 
65 
105 
106 
107 
108 
Weisbard "Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory" (1986) 
Neb LR 749,758. 
Above n 22, 252, and n 30, 787. 
Above n 30, 791. 
Canterbury, Above n 30, 790. 
For example Scarcia v St Paul & Marina Insurance Co 68 Wis. 2d 1 227 N.W. 2d at 790 and 
Ritz v Florida patient's Compensation Fund 436 So. 2d 987 (Fla. app. 1983). 
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( b) Treatment of alternatives at common law 
Disclosure of alternatives is equally contentious at common law. However are some 
examples of the availability of options being influential upon the Court. 109 For 
example in F v R the case was lost because, although the doctor failed to warn of 
the risks of the sterilisation operation failing the Court held that the sterilisation was 
the only alternative open to the woman and therefore it would not have been refused 
even if the risk was disclosed. This implies that if there had been a valid alternative 
with a lower failure rate, the doctor would have been liable for not disclosing it. In 
the Canadian case of Haughian v Payne 11 0 the doctor failed to advise about the 
benefits of "conservative management" for a patient with a neck injury. As a result 
of the operation the patient was injured. The Court held that the failure to discuss 
the options undermined the patient's ability to provide informed consent. Thus 
there is some scope for the disclosure of alternatives at common law however this 
is far less certain and wide reaching than the clear right in the Code. 
( c) Risks and alternatives under the Code 
The hurdle most dangerous to other risks and alternatives is the causation issue. 
Often the information is considered material but not sufficient to fulfil the causation 
element. The Code does not include the causation element. Therefore the question 
as to whether the non disclosure led to the person undergoing the procedure need 
not be asked. Instead the requirement of the reasonable consumer in that 
consumer's circumstance relates only to whether the information was material and 
the Commissioner is not obliged in this to follow the international legal standard in 
answering this. 
3 Legal, professional, ethical and other relevant standards 
(e) Any other information required by legal, professional, ethical, and other relevant standards ... 
Additional standards can only raise the level of information required by the consumer. 
As previously discussed other legal standards are less useful than they may appear 
because of the lack of clarity over which approach to follow. However professional 
and ethical standards are more influential. 
109 
110 
Above n 19, 109. 
(1987) 55 SaskR 99; [1987] 4 WWR 97; (1987) 37 DLR 4th 624; (1987) 40 CCLT 13, CA. 
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Professional standards are those imposed internally by which a member of a 
profession can be sanctioned by their peers. Section 4 categorises health care 
professionals by the governing Acts that they fall under. Disciplinary bodies follow 
this pattern. 
Ethical standards provided more concern in the drafting of the Code. Ethical standards 
are included in Right 4 (b) as well as in Right 6. P Skegg made the point that law and 
ethics are still distinct concepts and that "it does not follow from the fact that 
something is unethical that there ought to be a law against it" .111 His concern was 
that the Code was elevating ethical standards into legal ones. In reality this may be an 
academic difference only, as professional bodies use breaches of ethical standards as 
grounds for discipline. 
Concern was also raised in regard to the reference to "any other standard" which may 
allow incorporation into law of standards set by groups outside the parliamentary, 
executive or legal processes. 112 Although this is a valid concern it can be responded to 
on the basis that standards included under this head will be ones that the health 
provider have subjected themselves to voluntarily; such as the Organisation Wide 
Standards of the New Zealand Council on Healthcare Standards. These standards only 
apply to bodies which have acceded to them. There is an argument that if these bodies 
are incorporated by Right 6 (1) they become analogous to the panel in P v Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin pie and another.113 In this case the body 
operated a Code which effectively regulated the finance industry in London. Although 
the source of the bodies power was not statutory, the House of Lords held that the 
body was judicially reviewable because of the public law nature of their power. 
Equally influential was the statutory recognition of the operation of the Code and the 
consequent refusal to legislate in the same area. 114 Similarly, other standards which 
may become influential under the Health and Disability Code have both a public 
element and statutory recognition. As such they are drawn into the arena of 
government via judicial review, thereby negating the original criticism. 
11 1 
112 
113 
114 
Above n 78, 2., see also Correspondence from R Paterson to K Poutasi concerning the Draft 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Right, 19 December 1995, Ministry of 
Health file ADl0-23-5#2., 6. 
Correspondence from B Greer: Nursing Council of New Zealand, to K Poutasi concerning the 
Draft Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Right 11 December 1995, Ministry 
of Health file ADl0-23-5#2. 
(Norton Opax plc and another intervening) [1987] 1 All ER 564. 
For a discussion of this case on this point see P P Craig Administrative Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1994) 565-570. 
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Following is a summary of some of the standards on informed consent which may 
gain legislative standing under Right 6. 
( a) Medical Council of New 'Zealand 
In 1990 the Medical Council of New Zealand published a statement on informed 
consent. 115 
Reflected in this was that the information dissemination should: 
a) be in language appropriate to allow that particular patient to make an informed 
decision. 
b) be of such scope as to reflect the knowledge of the actual patient and the 
practitioner. 
c) more generally reflect what a prudent patient in similar circumstances would 
expect. 
Examples of the type of information that the doctor should consider are: 116 
115 
116 
a) The nature, status and purpose of the procedure, including its expected 
benefits, and an indication as to whether it is orthodox, unorthodox or 
experimental. 
b) The likelihood of the available doctors achieving the specific outcome that the 
patient seeks. 
c) The appropriate and relevant management options or alternatives and their 
possible effects and outcomes. 
d) The associated physical, emotional, mental, social and sexual outcomes that 
may accompany the proposed management. 
e) Significant known risks, including general risks associated with procedures 
such as anaesthesia, the degree of risk and the likelihood of it occurring for that 
particular patient. 
f) Any likely or common side effects, particularly in drug therapy. 
g) The consequences of not accepting the proposed treatment. 
h) The name and status of the person who will carry out the management and of 
others, from time to time who may continue the management. 
This is an advanced standard including both subjective and objective elements. Of 
great importance is the fact that this standard is actually more subjective than the 
one specified in Right 6. There is scope for a consideration of the particular patient 
Above n 12, 59-60. A comprehensive discussion paper was released in 1995, see above n 55. 
Medical Council of New Zealand A Statement for the Medical Profession on Infonnation and 
Consent (Wellington, 1995). 
117 
118 
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with the prudent patient being invoked separately to reflect general consideration. 
The actual patient is not the same as the "reasonable consumer in that consumer's 
circumstance" unless "reasonable" is interpreted, as argued, as relating to the 
relationship between the provider and consumer. 
If a doctor can be shown to have failed to fulfil this standard, they may be liable for 
disciplinary action. This is reaffirmed in the Guide to Doctors Entering Practice 
published by the Medical Council.117 
Although the standard of good medical practice is not synonymous with the legal 
standard in a patient focused approach it is invaluable as an indicator of the 
professional assessment of reasonableness. In the jurisdictions where a doctor 
based standard was applied the concerns of the medical profession featured 
influentially. 
(b) Department of Health 
As a result of the Cartwright Report the Minister of Health asked the Department to 
comment on informed consent for health care providers. This was released in 
1991.118 
The discussion was centred around the principles of autonomy, responsibility and 
accountability and are intended to assist providers achieve "user centred health 
care". 
The principle of autonomy leads to guidelines that include provision of information 
that is "accurate, objective, relevant, and culturally appropriate". The minimum 
standard of disclosure is framed as reflecting the doctors professional assessment. 
For example "the provider's professional assessment of the nature, likely effects, 
risks and benefits of the proposed treatment". However in addition to this is added: 
Providers should make sure that the information they give is specific to each individual 
situation. They should include any information which is likely to significantly affect the 
user's decision-for instance, the health care provider's own relevant experience. 
Medical Council of New Zealand Extract From: Medical Practice in New 7.ealand: A Guide 
to Doctors Entering Practice (Wellington, 1995) 12-29. 
Department of Health Principles and Guidelines for Informed Choice and Consent: For All 
Health Providers (Wellington, 1991), all reference in this section are drawn directly from this 
paper. 
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... As well providers should supply any information that they think may be relevant to the 
particular user, since users often do not know what questions to ask. 
This is all prefaced by the need for effective communication. 
Subsequent principles highlight the primacy of responsibility falling upon the 
provider. Nevertheless the responsibility of the user to provide further information 
concerning their condition and circumstance is emphasised. This assists the doctor 
assess what information is relevant. 
If these principles were proposed as a legal test of negligent they would be 
reminiscent of the doctor focus because relevance is judged by the doctors' 
assessment. Although the information must be relevant, relevance is determined by 
what the doctor thinks. Arguably this is similar to the "reasonable body of medical 
men" test. 119 This is mitigated by the requirements of communication and a 
collaborative relationship, but it may fall short of providing the "right of each 
person to [their] individual beliefs, desires, values, and goals" as laid out at the 
beginning of the guidelines. 
Notably this is not a guideline that forms the basis for a negligence action. It is 
aimed at regulating and assisting the medical profession. However it does add to 
the health culture of informed consent in New Zealand, and as such adds to a 
picture of the rights of the health services consumer. In relation to the Code it does 
not advance the rights covered. 
( c) Health Enterprise Policies 
In 1993 the Ministry of Health also released the Ethical Standards for Crown 
Health Enterprises: Guidelines. 120 This included a list of suggested policies and 
procedures which all Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) should include. In itself 
this is not binding, however notably a number of Regional Health Authorities 
(RHAs) had incorporated it into their statements of intent. 121 However all that 
these guidelines requires is that the CHE has appropriate procedures in place to 
ensure informed consent is gained. 
See above n 15. Also see above Part III C 1 (a). 
Ministry of Health Ethical Standards for Crown Health Enterprises: Guidelines (Wellington, 
September 1993) see particularly 6. 
See Central RHA Statement of Intent 1996-99 s2.l.9, and Southern RHA Statement of 
Intent 1996-97 s3 .l.9. 
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The policy of Capital Coast Health is taken from their Clinical Policy & Procedures 
Manual. 122 Prefacing the policy is a brief reference to the principles of Autonomy, 
veracity, justice, beneficence, non malificence, respect for person and the Treaty of 
Waitangi, with emphasis on the relationship of trust between the parties. A part of 
the Medical Council ' s statement is quoted followed by: 
The information should reflect what a prudent patient in similar circumstances would expect 
to receive, and also reflect the knowledge and requirements of tbe particular patient 
Notably this is the part of the statement which is more subjective that the 
"reasonable consumer in that consumer's circumstance". 
( d) Conclusion 
Right 6 (l)(e) introduces a wide range of considerations which extend well beyond 
the rights directly included in the Code. Given that the Code operates in an area that 
already interfaces frequently in terms of obligations perhaps this is not a difficulty 
in practice. For examples 11 (2)(b) of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 
obliges providers to uphold ethical requirements. Both the Southern and Central 
RHAs demand consistency with the Ministry of Health guidelines on Informed 
Consent, the guidelines for CHEs and the Code. Professional bodies apply these 
standards as part of the grounds for discipline. The Code now forms part of this 
matrix of obligations. However in doing so it is important to recognise that the 
parameters of the Commissioners mandate extends beyond the express rights in the 
Code. 
F Right 6 (3 ), Specific Queries and that Particular Patient 
A duty upon a doctor to answer a query with a full and frank reply is well established 
in the common law. Even the Sidaway approach covers specific questions, subject to 
therapeutic privilege. 123 In Smith v Auckland Area Health Board the Court held that 
although they were not laying down a general standard for disclosure, any questions 
asked about risks must be afforded a "careful and reasonably accurate reply".124 This 
was to reflect the reliance the patient placed upon the answer. F v R and Rogers make 
122 
123 
124 
Capital Coast Health Clinical Policy & Procedures Manual: Informed Consent Policy 
(Wellington, 1995). 
Above n 17, 895, 898, 902-903 . 
Above n 14, 227-228. 
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reference to the patient's desire for the information. 125 However scope is maintained 
for therapeutic privilege, 126 with the Judge in Rogers stating: 
127 
['Ilhe fact that the patient asked questions revealing their concern about the risk would make 
the doctor aware that this patient did in fact attach significance to the risk. Subject to the 
therapeutic privilege, the question would therefore require a truthful answer. 
Battersby v Tottman 128 is an Australian case where this privilege was applied. The 
doctor failed to disclose the risk of serious eye damage from a prescribed course of 
drugs, to a patient suffering from mental illness. This was done because although the 
treatment was considered necessary to save her life, her mental illness would prevent 
her from making a rational decision. The Court upheld this suppression on the 
grounds that the patient was likely to react irrationally to the information and make a 
poor decision or even exhibit "hysterical blindness". 
Thus if the disclosure may actively harm the patient either mentally or physically, or if 
the disclosure will disturb the patient so extremely as to preclude rational decision 
making, the use of therapeutic privilege may be justified. There is some danger of this 
avenue being used to "devour the disclosure rule itself'. 129 Therapeutic privilege must 
not be used to replace the patient's assessment with the doctor's just because the two 
are inconsistent. 
Therapeutic privilege is maintained in the Code under Clause 3 (3) as a defence of the 
consumer's clinical circumstance. However when this is read along with the right to 
respect, dignity and independence then there is little scope for a wide interpretation. 
G The Right Not to Receive Information 
The New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA)130 and a number of the submissions 
queried the omission of a clear right to waive disclosure. This right is expressed in the 
World Health Organisation on the Promotion of Patient's Rights in Europe 1994, and 
was quoted in the draft Code submitted for public consultation.
131 It was not 
included. 
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This is a right that exists at common law, which is mentioned in prominent c
ases, but 
seldom applied directly. 132 It is a manifestation of the very principle upon w
hich the 
right to information stems, the right to autonomy. Forcing information upon 
someone 
is as much a violation of their autonomy as withholding information they requ
ire. 
Kennedy asserts that if required to decide the issue, the Courts would 
probably 
uphold the waiver of information on risks and alternatives so long as it was
 real and 
voluntary, but require disclosure of the nature and purpose of the procedure.
133 
The NZMA posited that the "ludicrous" situation could arise where the pat
ient does 
not want the information but the doctor must provide it.13
4 This is incorrect. The 
existence of a right is not the same as the existence of an obligation. The cons
umer can 
exercise their right to be fully informed, it provides them with a legal clai
m on the 
information. It does not oblige them to take it. This is enforced by Right 1 (
b) which 
places a duty on providers to enable the consumer to exercise their rights, t
he actual 
exercise of the rights is within the jurisdiction of the consumer. By specif
ying the 
reasonable consumer as the consumer in that consumers circumsta
nce, the 
Commissioner allows the individual needs of the patient to dictate what inf
ormation 
they require. By prescribing the right to be "fully informed" as opposed 
to be in 
possession of full information, the Commissioner allows this to be tested by t
he needs 
of the individual. 135 If the provider possesses the knowledge that the consum
er does 
not wish to be fully informed, it would seem a mockery of the rights to
 respect, 
independence and dignity that they can ignore it and proceed with disclosure. 
It will be 
the role of the consumer to convey their request. 
H The Lack of Causation 
1 Causation not an appropriate element of a breach 
Given that the Code does not define the elements of informed consent there
 is scope 
for the Commissioner to look to the common law to assist her. This is strengt
hened by 
the obvious awareness of the Commissioner in the drafting of the Code of th
ese legal 
standards. The Commissioner will need to be wary of direct application 
of these 
132 
133 
134 
135 
See discussion in Giesen above n 36, par 827-31, Reibl and F v R. 
Above n 33, 233. 
Above n 130. 
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standards as they contain some elements that are not appropriate to the HDCA and the 
Code. 
Primarily this involves the scope for imposition of a causation element. It is this 
element which has been most destructive to patient rights in the use of the informed 
consent doctrine. 136 Despite the fact that in jury is not relevant to a breach of Right 6, 
there is danger that if the Commissioner turns to the usual legal debates in the case 
law, some element of causation will be transposed. In this debate causation impacts on 
both the final causation element and the determination of material information in terms 
of the duty of care. This is discussed earlier in this paper.137 The writer argues that 
causation, under either element, is inappropriate when establishing a breach of the 
Code because it violates the intention of the scheme. The Code is not a protection from 
damage or an instrument of regulation or blame. It is primarily a tool of the individual 
to guarantee that their rights are being observed. The rights that they are granted by the 
Code are rights to services and procedures, with disclosure of information being a 
procedure, and not to results. Thus it is consistent that the sanctions should hinge 
upon the delivery of those procedures and not upon whether the breach had an adverse 
result. 
2 Causation not an appropriate element of damages 
If causation has any relevance this may only be at the damages stage before the CRT, 
following a conclusion that a breach has occurred. The scope of this relevance is 
arguable. The writer argue that the usual test for causation is not introduced to the 
Code by way of the damages provision. 
Section 57 governs the award of damages. The primary ingredient is a breach of the 
Code. Quantification is then based upon: 
136 
137 
(a) Pecuniary loss suffered as a result of, and expenses reasonably incurred by the aggrieved 
person for the purpose of, the transaction or activity out of which the breach arose: 
(b) Loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which the aggrieved person might 
reasonably have expected to obtain but for the breach: 
(c) Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the aggrieved person: 
(d) Any action of the defendant that was in flagrant disregard of the rights of the aggrieved 
person. 
See above part III C 3 (b). 
See above part III C 3 (b). 
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The Tribunal is free to determine whether the breach resulted in the loss as 
they see fit. 
This need not be in accordance with the objective test of causation demonst
rated in the 
majority of cases. 
It is important to note that at law the imposition of damages is separate from
 the 
determination of damage. Modem law has tended to consider determination
 of damage 
or causation as an element of the breach. Thus causation is not considered a
s part and 
parcel of the imposition of damages. 138 Therefore the common law positio
n on 
causation is not directly relevant to s 57. Issues of remoteness are dealt wit
h under 
causation not under damages. 139 
Applying usual tortious standards, s 57 determines how best the claimant c
an be 
placed back in the position they would have been but for the breach. This is
 limited by 
reasonableness of the claim. Reasonableness relates more consistently to a 
standard 
upon the claimant not to demand unreasonable measures to return them to t
he position 
they consider they would have been in. This distinguishes it from reasonab
leness as 
used in the sense of the mythical reasonable patient. In support of this, the 
test of 
reasonableness is attached only to the additional expenses incurred and not 
the general 
pecuniary losses such as loss of earnings. All general pecuniary losses are 
compensatable whether they are the result of the actions of a reasonable con
sumer or 
not. Conversely, the fact that the complainant is used to treatment in a priva
te hospital 
with a wine licence even though they could be treated as quickly and well u
nder public 
health will not oblige the defendant to compensate the private medical expe
nses. 
Additionally reasonableness is attached to anticipation of benefits. Intangibl
e 
quantification such as this require a limitation when someone is being rende
red liable 
for them. Loss of a chance is only compensatable if the chance was substantia
l and not 
speculative.140 Missing the week of work where your colleagues decided to
 purchase 
a lotto ticket that happened to win is not a loss that the defendant should or 
would 
reasonably be liable for. 
Therefore if a doctor does not disclose information which although a 
reasonable 
patient would not have acted upon, the particular patient would have, th
e doctor is 
liable for all the loss of earnings and expenses, except those which are unre
asonable to 
place the person in the position they would have been in or misrepresent t
he position 
they would have been in. 
138 
139 
140 
Above n 29, 862. 
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. 
39 
I Conclusion 
Because the Code exists separate to the common law it can reinterpret some of the 
conventional assumptions which have operated to disadvantage the subjective needs of 
health services consumers. This is most notable with regard to the reasonable 
consumer. This is consistent with a context which concentrates on the rights of the 
consumer to procedures of informed consent and not upon compensating injuries. 
Additionally, in specifying the types of information that the reasonable consumer 
would expect in Right 6 (1) the Code returns the boundaries of material information to 
information required to allow informed consent, as opposed to information sufficient 
to warn the consumer and protect the provider. 
VI 
A 
THE EFFECT OF RIGHT SIX ON NEGLIGENCE AT 
COMMON LAW 
Negligence and Statute Law 
Although the common law and statutory law are conceptually different concepts there 
are still interfaces between them. A transfer of ideas between the forums is becoming 
more acceptable. 141 This reflects a desire to retain consistency, and to acknowledge 
that statutes in areas analogous to the common law may represent the current 
perception of public policy. This approach has been favoured in New Zealand, 
142when Cooke P was influenced by the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978 as an 
indication of legislative policy in determining on an issue of client-solicitor privilege. 
As Lord Dip lock said in 1979: 143 
Where over a period of years there can be discerned a steady trend in legislation which reflect 
the views of successive parliaments as to what the public interest demands in a particular field 
of law, development of the common law in that part of the same field that has been left ought 
to proceed upon a parallel rather than a divergent course. 
In Matthews v MacLaren 144 this approach was applied specifically in the area of 
negligence when a pleasure boat operator was found responsible for a negligent rescue 
attempt which resulted in two deaths. The Court was influenced by statutory 
141 
142 
143 
144 
See discussion above in Burrows, n 89, 259-263. 
R v Uljee [1982) 1 NZLR 561. 
Erven Wamink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731, 743. 
(1969) 4 DLR (3d) 557. 
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prov1s10ns which imposed a responsibility to rescue strangers at sea. Although this 
did not apply the Court stated; "the common law must keep pace with the demands and 
expectations of a civilised community" 145 and thus must not be less solicitous than the 
statutory provision. 
This is similar to the line that has been taken concerning the criminal law and 
negligence. However a crime may be regarded as setting a minimal standard, lower 
than the duty of care in a negligence action, thus a criminal acquittal will not 
necessarily prove that the tortious duty of care was fulfilled. 146 
The Code is a clear example of a decisive legislative policy. The wide consultation 
requirements which contributed towards its formulation add credence to the claim that 
it represents the public perception of appropriate behaviour between providers and 
consumers. However this will only be indicative of the standard of care, in the end the 
conclusion will be a result of all the circumstances of the case, and the degree of 
influence will depend on how closely the analogy can be drawn between the provision 
of the Code and the negligence claimed. 
B Conclusion 
There is no direct link between the standard of negligence regarding informed consent 
and Rights 6 of the Code. This will be especially relevant for ACC which requires 
negligence of cover. The purpose of ACC is to compensate for personal injury 
independent of an assessment of fault. 147 Ostensibly this is even more consumer 
focused than the Code which needs to attach liability to a provider and as such needs 
to balance fairness between them. The consumer focus provides a clear parallel 
between the two schemes. The additional element of no fault in ACC should push it 
even further towards subjective consideration of the claimant. There is no excuse for 
following the English approach which focuses upon the doctor more than the patient 
145 
146 
147 
Above n 144, 563. 
See discussion in Todd above n 29, 277-279. 
See the Long title of the ARCIA and AO Woodhouse New 'Zealand Royal Commission to 
Inquiry into and Report Upon Workers' Compensation. (Government Print, Wellington, 
1967). 
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VII BREACH OF A STATUTORY DUTY 
A Scope For a Statutory Duty 
Another important interface between the Code and the common law is the potential 
liability for a breach of statutory duty for those who breach the Code. This is 
considered in this paper for two reasons. First it determines the breadth of influence 
that the Code has in the common law. Second if the Code sustains an actionable 
statutory duty the link between the interpretation of Right 6 and the traditional 
approaches of the common law are more closely linked than may initially appear. 
1 Existence of a duty 
Section 20 of the HDCA and reg 1 (2) of the Code, make it clear that a duty exists. 
Following each principle included in the Code is the requirement of a corresponding 
duty and obligation on the health care provider. 
2 Constructing a statutory duty 
The imposition of a duty under a statute does not necessarily disclose a right upon on 
the individual to seek damages. This requires an inference that parliament intended a 
civil right of action. Such an inference is made in light of all the circumstances and a 
construction of the Act. 148 Presumptions are applied in determining this intention, 
however case law evidences that these are often applied inconsistently. Some guidance 
can be taken from Lord Diplock's statement in 1982: 149 
... [O)ne starts with the presumption ... that 'where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the 
perfonnance in a specified manner ... that perfonnance can not be enforced in any other 
manner' ... [T)here are two classes of exception to this general rule. The first is where on the 
true construction of the Act it is apparent that the obligation or prohibition was imposed for 
the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals ... 
These presumptions are examined below. 
148 
149 
Atkinson v Newcastle (1877) 2 Ex. D 441, Cutler v Wandsworth [1949) AC 398, 407. 
Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum (No. 2) [1982) A.C. 173, quoted in Stanton below n 150, 35. 
150 
151 
152 
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(a) Alternative Modes of Enforcement 
If a statute has no enforcement provisions it is more likely that a statutory duty will 
be found. 150 
[W]here an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we 
take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. 
However this is not conclusive. 
One of the main purposes of the HDCA and the Code is to create effective remedies 
for a breach. Such provisions indicate legislative intention to limit the pursuit of 
remedies in other spheres. In describing the Bill, both the Rt. Hon J Shipley and K 
O'Reagan reiterated that this is an Act aimed at resolving disputes at the level 
closest the source where possible. 151 The preamble of the Act states that it is to 
"secure the fair, simple, speedy, and efficient resolution of complaints of the rights 
encapsulated by the Code". 
Indeed the comprehensive harmonisation of the various remedies available at 
present to redress medical breaches of rights affirms this. Interfaces between 
remedies under ACC are considered in section 52 (2). Interfaces between the 
Commissioner and medical disciplinary bodies was carefully considered and are 
linked to the Medical Practitioners Act 1995 which came into force on the same day 
as the Code. The Commissioner acts as a place of first inquiry for such complaints 
and reserves a function for itself in bringing and advocating along side the 
complainants. 152 
Read together, these demonstrate an intention to avoid court procedures which are 
often the antithesis of the aims under this Act. For example, litigation is adversarial 
not mediated, expensive not financially accessible, protracted not "speedy". It is 
exactly the related difficulties of litigation that this procedure was created to avoid. 
It is unlikely that parliament intended to create another means of enforcing the 
Code. 
Doe dem. Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1831) B & Ad. 847. See also 
Auckland CC v Hellaby [1924] NZLR 964, Wyatt v Hillington London Borough Council 
(1978) 76 LGR 727. and discussion in KM Stanton Breach of Statutory Duty in Tort (Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 1986), 34. 
(1994) 543 NZPD 3735 and 4298. 
See "Medical Practitioners Act 1995: Discipline" MC News, May 1996. 
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(b) The Class Test 
Provision of a mode of enforcement has proved indeterminate in situations where a 
benefit was intended for a discernible class as opposed to the general public. 
Classes have included gas consumers153 and the homeless154, therefore there is 
fair expectation that health consumers would fulfil the definition. The members of 
this class are presumed to be able to sue for a breach. 
However a further examination of cases where this has been used when alternative 
remedies exist, reveals that the remedies provided were not of the type the HDCA 
prescribes. In Southwark London Borough Council v Williams 155 where the 
availability of judicial review because of a possibility of ministerial intervention 
was considered inadequate to negate a statutory duty. This was because judicial 
review was considered unsatisfactory for the use of an individual with regard to 
obligations owed personally to them. The Court indicated that judicial review is a 
remedy more appropriate for public law resource allocation than for the individual 
whose statutory right to accommodation was being breached. 156 The New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Pease & Others v Eltham Borough Council 157 held that a 
general remedy under the Crimes Act, s 129 did not preclude a statutory duty as it 
did not demonstrate an intention on parliament to exclude others remedies nor did it 
detract from individual rights of the members of that class. MacEachern v 
Pukehohe Borough Counci[158 involved the provision and maintenance of fire 
hydrants, no specific penalty was provided for the breach of this. However a 
general catch all penalty existed for breaches not otherwise covered. The Court held 
this was insufficient to exclude a statutory duty. 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
In all these cases the remedy available was not the most appropriate for redress for 
the individual claimant. As such the court inferred that the legislature would not 
intend to remove a remedy which was best suited to the needs of the claimant 
These circumstances are different from the HDCA. As noted the purpose of this 
Act is to provide the most appropriate response to the individual rights of the 
Morton v ElthLlm Borough [1961] NZLR 1 and Pease & Others v ElthLlm Borough Council 
[1962) NZLR 437. 
Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971) Cb. 734. 
Above n 154. 
See Stanton above n 150, 38-39. 
[1962) NZLR 437 
[1965) NZLR 330. 
44 
claimant. Thus the writer concludes that the class exception would not aid an 
application for a statutory duty and redress for its breach. 
B Nature of the Action 
1 Negligence tort or separate action 
If the Code could maintain a statutory duty, the nature of this duty is fundamental. 
This alters whether the common law doctrine of informed consent is directly connected 
to Right 6. If the statutory duty is not a negligence action there is no direct link 
between the Code and negligence. 
The United States and Canada support statutory duty as a particular species of 
negligence. This is favoured because often the statute will crystallise the reasonable 
care test, and provides certainty where the common law can not. If accepted, there is 
further issue with the evidentiary value of the statute in defining the standard of care 
for negligence. Either the statute defines negligence per se or it is merely prima facie 
evidence of negligence. The later has been supported in the Canada.159 
In the UK statutory duty is viewed as distinct from negligence. 160 Therefore, a 
finding of breach of statutory duty will not conclude the issue of the standard of 
reasonableness for negligence. If the common law test is higher or broader this will 
not be limited by the statute. l61 Interplay will remain as statutory provision may alter 
the accepted practices. 
C Conclusion 
If a statutory duty could be constructed, unless the breach of statutory duty is regarded 
as an action in tort the distance between the Code and the Common law remains. 
However it a stronger argument that no statutory duty lies within the Code. The 
HDCA is intended to avoid the very court procedures that a statutory duty would 
allow. 
159 
160 
161 
Saskatchewan (1983) 143 DLR (3d) 9. 
LPTB v Upson (1949) AC 155. 
Bux v Slough (1973) 1 WLR 1359. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of informed consent is an acknowledgement of the primacy of the patient 
as an individual person in the medical setting. Its interpretation through tortious 
negligence, has often operated to undermine this intention. Instead it has focused on 
determining liability in a manner that the medical professions find easiest to operate 
within, predict and avoid. Thus what was a duty to inform patients sufficiently to 
facilitate informed decision making, became a means of avoiding responsibility for 
risks which eventuated following a failure to warn. The difference between the fairy 
tale and the reality is vast. 
It this environment that the Code was born into. However the Code has not become 
part of this. Instead it exists separately with its own standards and its own 
enforcement. The ethos of the HDCA is markedly different from that of negligence 
actions. The Code does not determine breaches according to physical injury, focusing 
instead on procedures. This is an acknowledgement that health is broader than 
physical well being. This acknowledgement is not that far from the original intention 
of informed consent, that the patient decides what is in their own best interests, using 
whatever personal values that they choose. By focusing on processes, the integrity of 
informed consent can be recaptured and released from the compromises of causation. 
Similar to the North American and Australian approaches the Code refers to the 
reasonable consumer in that consumer's circumstance. In this paper the writer has 
argued that this can be interpreted to require the consumer to act reasonably to those 
involved, instead of requiring that they decide reasonably according others. This is 
consistent with the purely subjective right to refuse medical treatment in the Bill of 
Rights, and avoids unfair expectations on inadequately informed health professions. 
However even interpreting "reasonable" in the traditional manner the Code takes the 
patient's rights further than the doctrine of informed consent has previously. 
Case law has focused on the direct steps which resulted in damage. Under the Code 
the consumer is given rights to the full range of information required to make choice 
and give consent. This includes an explanation of their condition, and the results of 
tests and procedures. Importantly it also requires information about the options 
available to the patient and the risks and advantages of each option. This is not 
restricted to covering the risks of the procedure chosen but allows for the consumer to 
choose between procedures, having a full picture of their options not just the 
likelihood of risks of the recommended treatments. 
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This paper contains a warning for Code interpretation. In examining the case law it 
will not be sufficient just to ignore the obvious causation discussions. Causation is 
introduced more subtly into the discussions about the duty of care via the materiality 
element. causation is not appropriate in the HDCA culture. 
Finally it is concluded that the Code may have an impact beyond its own parameters. 
Although not an action of negligence, a Court considering such an action would be 
correct to consider the Code as a legislative and societal indication of current 
perceptions about the requirements upon the medical professions. It must be conceded 
that the purpose of the Code and neglience are not identical. However it must also be 
realised that the purpose of informed consent is the same whatever the enforcement 
setting. 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with bis own body.162 
162 Above n 25 . 
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